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I. INTRODUCTION
Objective and Scope
In the December, 1963 issue of the Journal of Farm Economics , Robert L.
Clodius stated, "In the contrast between farm firms and nonfarm firms it
should be apparent that the farmer has little market power. This is true at
the local market level where the farmer sells his livestock, grain and milk
and buys his feed, fertilizer and farm machinery." With the mechanization of
farms, the relative importance of farm equipment in the farm organization has
increased. The value of farm machinery shipments increased from $112 million
2
in 1904 to $364 million in 1959 and to $2,842 million in I963. The increasing
importance of farm equipment as an input for the farm sector points towards
changes in the market power interrelationships between the farm equipment manu-
facturers, dealers and the farm operator. The number of dealers between 1940
3
and 1958 decreased from 27,500 "to 18,000, and the number of full-line manu-
facturers dropped from nine in 1940 to seven in 1966. The fluctuation in
numbers indicates that major changes have taken place in the environment which
surrounds firms in the industry.
The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the changes that have
occurred in the variables of market structure as they are related to the farm
Robert L. Clodius, "Lessons for Farm Economist from Recent Antitrust
Decisions - An Economist's View." Journal of Farm Economics 44 (December,
1962), 1904.
2
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers , 1914, 1940, 1963,
(Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office )
.
'w. G. Phillips, "The Changing Structure of Markets for Farm Machinery"
Journal of Farm Economics 40 (December, 1958), p. 1173.
equipment, manufacturers and dealerships and (2) to show possible implications
as to future changes as a result of trends established by the analysis of past
changes. Inferences on market performance and market conduct will be made
where possible.
Theoretical Bases for the Analysis
A basic economic postulate fundamental to market structure analysis is
that the structural or environmental nature of an' industry influences market
conduct which is in turn related to market performance of that industry.
Economic theory supporting the postulate is founded in two areas, Marshallian
price theory and institutional economics. Marshallian economics emphasized
two polar cases for the analysis of market performance: perfect competition
and monopoly. Elaborate economic models explaining the relative performance of
these two illustrative cases of market structure are available in the litera-
ture. As formal theorists became increasingly aware of the wide variations to
be found in the real world in the conduct of firms and in the performance of
industries, modifications were made in the assumptions regarding number and
size of firms, product and mobility. Fellner's treatment of number and sizes,
Chamberlin's-' consideration of product characteristics, and Bain's study of
entry were significant contributions in the variables associated with market
structure. Institutional economists using their own techniques of economic an-
alysis have concentrated on studying the institutional aspects of organization
k
W. J. Fellner, Competition Among the Few ; Oligopoly and Similar Market
Structurer
. led. (New York: A. A. Knoph, 195?.)
"
^E, H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition . 2ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 193&!)
J. S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1956).
and performances of industrial and labor markets. They have pointed out certain
imperfections of markets. Thus from these two divergent schools of economics
has developed the vast area of economics studies related to the performance of
markets as influenced by the market structure of the industry.
Throughout this discussion "industry" and "market" will be used and the
definition of both is important. Because Professor Bain's definitions are
generally accepted, they will be used. "An industry is strictly a group of
7
sellers of close-substitute outputs who supply a common group of buyers." "A
market is conveniently defined as a closely interrelated group of sellers and
buyers. Therefore we may define a market as including all the sellers in any
ft
individual industry, and all the buyers to whom they sell." The strict appli-
cation of these definitions to empirical research is impractical, if not
impossible, without some application of a prior knowledge. But, they do serve
as specific concepts that are applied to the report. The deliniation of these
terms relative to the farm equipment industry will be discussed later.
What is market structure analysis? Walsh and Evans define it negatively.
"Market structure analysis is less concerned with the private interest in the
maximization of individual bakery firm profits, levels than with the public
interest in greater per capita production, more optimum distribution of resources,
9freedom of opportunity and the like." Market structure analysis is synonymous
with market organization. The study of market organization is encompassed in
three areas those of market structure, market conduct, and market performance.
7
Joe Bain, Industrial Organization
.
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1959), P. 6.
8
Ibid. 7.
9Richard G. Walsh and Bert M. Evans, Economics of Change in Market Struc-
ture
,
Conduct and Performance - The Baking Industry 1947-1958 . University of
Nebraska, N.S. No. 28 (Lincoln, Nebraska, December, 1963), p. 3.
"Market structure refers here to the organizational characteristics of a market;
and for practical purposes we emphasize those characteristics which determine
the relations of sellers in the market to each other, of buyers in the market
to each other, of sellers to the buyers, and of sellers established in the
market to other actual or potential suppliers of goods, including potential new
firms which might enter the market. In other words, market structure for prac-
tical purposes means those characteristics of the organization of a market
which seem to influence strategically the nature of competition and prices with-
in the market." From various patterns of market structure we can infer certain
market performance characteristics.
Whereas market structure is concerned with the environment of the industry,
market conduct centers on the pattern of behavior which enterprises follow in
adopting or adjusting to the market in which they sell or buy. It encompasses
the patterns of behavior displayed by firms in their policies related to the
product market and to rival firms in the market. The manner in which firms
adjust reflects in the efficiency of their operation* The flow of influence be-
tween market structure and market conduct is towards the latter. The enviro-
ment of the industry affects the individual firm to some extent, but the degree
to which structure influences conduct is difficult to determine.
Richard Caves defines; "market performance as the appraisal of how much
the economic results of an industry's market behavior deviate from the best
12
possible contribution it could make to achieving these goals." Economists
are concerned with finding gaps between actual performance and potential
Joe Bain, Industrial Organization
, p. 7.
nibid., 9.
nichard Caves, American Industry ; Structure
, Conduct , Performance .
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 196**), p. 95.
performance of individual industries. They are interested in identifying the
features of market structure and market conduct that result in deviations from
the potential. For example, established firms tend to side step new innovations
and new comers use new innovations as a means to enter the market. Thus, high
barriers to entry tend to discourage innovations.
In studying the market structure of an industry Bain emphasized these
four organizational characteristics of a market:
1. The degree of seller concentration - described by the number
and the size distribution of sellers in the market.
2. The degree of buyer concentration - defined in parallel
fashion.
3. The degree of product differentiation as among the outputs
(though similar) are viewed as nonidentical by buyers.
k. The condition of entry to the market - referring to the
relative ease or difficulty with which new sellers may enter
the market, have over other potential entrants.*3
Economic theory provides a set of market categories such as monopoly,
perfect competition, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The first two
categories account for the polar positions of market organization, and mon-
opolistic competition describes the industries with many sellers having a
differentiated product. Oligopoly, defined as a few sellers occupying the
market, is used to explain the gamut of possibilities between many and two.
The concept of concentration ratios has been devised as a structural
measure of the intermediate combinations. These ratios account for both number
and size distribution of firms. They are computed simply by arranging firms
in order of size (e.g. employees or sales), calculating the percentage share
each has of the industry and adding the percentages of the top x firms. The
usual breaking points are the largest four, largest eight, and largest twenty
firms in the industry.
13Ibid ., 8.
Realizing the arbitary nature of any grouping, Richard Caves groups
manufacturing industries as follows
:
Type I oligopolies - the largest eight firms make at least 50
per cent of the industries* shipments; the largest twenty
make at least 75 perccent.
Type II oligopolies - the largest eight firms make at least 33
per cent of the shipments; the largest twenty make less
than 75 per cent.
Unconcentrated industries - the largest., eight firms make less
than 33 per cent oftthe shipments.
This grouping will serve as a measure of the relative concentration of
sellers and buyers in the farm equipment industry. The degree of concentration
of buyers and sellers have a significant influence on the character, intensity
and effectiveness of competition among buyers and sellers and the character of
the relationship- between buyers and sellers.
The third characteristic, the degree of product differentiation, refers
to or measures the extent to which buyers differentiate, distinguish, or have,
specific preferences among the competing output of the various sellers esta-
blished in an industry. For example, how much substitutibility is there
between the tractors of the seven full-line farm equipment manufacturers. As
such, the degree of product differentiation is an important influence of the
character of the competitive relationships of the established member sellers
of the industry.
Cross-elasticity of demand between various pairs of output is the ideal
measure of the degree of product differentiation. The cross-elasticity of
demand between pairs of output will be perceptible and finite, but not infinite,
if buyers' preferences do exist.
14
Caves, 11.
J. S. Bain discusses three primary sources of product differentiation:
(1) the differences in quality or design among competing outputs.
(2) the ignorance of buyers regarding the essential characteristics.
(3) the persuasive sales-promotion activities of sellers, and
particularly by advestising. **
The last characteristic of market structure to be considered is the con-
dition of entry. The condition of entry to an industry essentially refers to
the degree of the advantages, which sellers already established in an industry
have over potential new entrant sellers. It thus determines the competitive
relationship between established and potential entrant sellers, and the effec-
tiveness of the threat of new competitors as a force governing the policies of
established sellers.
"The condition of entry may be measured on a numerical scale by defining
the advantage of established over-potential entrant sellers in a certain
systematic way, namely, as the largest percentage by which established sellers
can persistently elevate their prices above the minimized or competitive average
costs or production and distribution without inducing new sellers to enter the
17industry." The scope of this report is limited and this type of measurement
will not be attempted.
Bain identifies the following sources of barriers to entry:
(l) Product barriers
(a) accumulated preferences of buyers
(b) exclusive control of superior product design
(c) the ownership or control of favored system of distribution
15
Bain, Industrial Organization, pp. 214-215.
1
Ibid
.
. 210
17Ibic ., 23?.
(2) Absolute superiority
(a) control over superior production techniques
(b) exclusive ownership by established firms of superior
deposits of resources required
(c) inability of entrant firms to acquire necessary factors
of production
(d) less favored access of entrant firms to liquid funds
for investments. .. n
(3) Economy of scale barriers.
The four characteristics of market structure, so far discussed, the degree
of buyers and seller concentration, the barriers to entry and the degree of
product differentiation are only the primary characteristics. Others are
market demand, ratio of fixed to variable costs, geographical structure of the
market, and the degree of durability. These last characteristics will be
applied to the analysis where they are a major factor of change in the market
structure of the farm equipment industry.
Sources and Method
Census data does not cover separately the farm implement and machinery
business of the large concerns which the trade classifies as farm implement
manufacturers. The Bureau of the Census defines the farm machinery and equip-
ment industry as including "establishments that manufacture machinery for use
in the preparation and maintenance of the soil; planting and harvesting of the
crops; processing, on the farm, crops for market; or for use in performing
19
other farm operations and processes." A more acceptable definition would be
that the farm machinery and equipment industry includes those firms which
18
Ibid
., 240.
19
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers
. I963. "Industrial
Statistics: Engines and Turbines and Farm Machinery and Equipment MC 63 (2)-35A"
(Washington D.C. , U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 35.
manufacture machinery and tractors for use in preparing and maintaining the soil,
in the planting, cultivating and harvesting of crops and in marketing farm crops.
Since much of the published material is based on census data, this difference in
definition must be considered when making comparisons.
The farm machinery industry has an international market; however, the
domestic market is the primary outlet for production. In 1963, the total value
of tractor shipments in the United States was $1,631,875, 0C0 and only
20$60,159,000 or 3*2 per cent of this was for the export market. Imports of
farm machinery are small and will not be considered in the analysis. The study
involves only the United States.
Farm machinery manufacturers are classified as full-line and short-line
manufacturers. The full-line or long-line manufacturers are those engaged in
the manufacture of farm tillage implements, seeding and planting implements,
cultivators, harvesting machines, farm-hauling equipment and farm power -
21developing machinery. Short-line manufacturers are those who manufacture
implements of one or more lines but not a complete assortment. These short-
line producers generally operate in localized areas specalizing in implements
specific to that region.
The farm machinery industry began with the invention of the first suc-
22
cessfully operated reaper by Cyrus Hall McCormick in Virginia in 1831. The
major emphasis of this report begins in 1902 when the International Harvester
Co. was consolidated out of the five largest harvesting companies and controlled
20
U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States
1965 , 86th ed. (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, lfo'5), p. 819.
21
Another definition is those manufacturers who market a complete line
of machines and power units.
22,
William G. Phillips, The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada
,
(Toranto, Canada,; University of Toranto Press, 1956), p. 3.
10
90 percent of the trade in grain binders and 80 per cent in mowers for the
23
United States. •* This incorporation marked the beginning or the large full-
line manufacturer.
The life span of the industry has been broken into four stages, of devel-
opment: (1) pre-1920, (2) 1920-1939, (3) 19^0-1959, and (4) current market
conditions. The pre-1920 era covers the span of time during which the industry
was born and grew into large companies manufacturing full-lines. The 1920-
1940 period featured displacement of horses by the wheel-tractor and innovations
such as the rubber tire and power take-off system, both of which expanded the
use of" the tractor. With: the beginning of World War II, the industry exper-
ienced a rapid expansion of its retail organization which was followed in the
1950's by an adjustment to a slacking demand and also the rapid, acceptance by
farmers of new technology and larger units. The last stage is the current
period. Once again the demand for farm equipment has become strong, and the
demand for larger units exceeds that of the 1950's. The main source of material
for this analysis has been published reports. Some unpublished materials were
obtained from masters' thesis and doctoral dissertations and comments by George
H. Sefercwich, the editor of a trade magazine, Farm Implement and Tractor .
Among the foremost writers on structural aspects of the industry are W. G.
Phillips, Michael Conant, W. A. Cromarty. The U. S. Federal Trade Commission
made inquiries into the industry in 1913, 1920, 1939 and 19^8, providing val-
uable historical data. Also, the Federal Trade Commission repeatedly covers
the industry in its studies of concentration in the manufacturing industries.
The Bureau of the Census, through its publication, Census of Manufacturers
reports data on the industry. But this does not give a complete picture because
23Ibid., Ik.
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of the definition used. For example, a dealer is defined as an establishment .
selling primarly farm machinery and mixture of equipment. Some dealers also
handle automobiles and hardware, the difference between the types of merchan-
dise can cause a dealer to be reclassified although his business did not change.
The method of analysis has been to review available information on each
of the four market structure variables discussed above in each stage of the
development of the industry. Where information was not available, implied
relationships were used. From stage to stage, trends of changes are inferred
where possible to help in clarifying implications concerning future changes.
II. PRE - 1920 ERA OF MERGERS
The farm equipment industry's first boom came during and following the
Civil War. Farm labor was in short supply and farmers were willing to accept
the new harvesting machines. Throughout the war period, crops were generally
abundant and the demand for agricultural produce was high. From the end of the
Civil War to 1880, expansion westward continued the strong demand for the new
implements,.
Market stabilization followed in the 1890 f s when the number of manufact-
urers declined (Table 1) and competition among the remaining firms became reck-
less. W. G. Phillips describes the situation:
Such were the conditions in the American implement industry
which paved the way for the harvester war of the 1890*s and
for the wave of concentration that followed. During the
nineties, selling competition among harvesting machinery
producers was carried to what now appears rediculous extremes.
Flamboyant advertising, extravagent field contests, and un-
believably easy terms all seen to have been the order of the
day.1
This competitive phase was followed by mergers between the rival companies.
In 1902, the International Harvester Company was organized by the consolidation
of the five largest producers of harvesting machinery. They were the McCormick
Harvesting Machinery Company, the Deering Harvester Company, the Piano Manufac-
turing, the Warder, Bushell and Glessner Company, and the Milwaukee Harvester
2
Company. Later in the period the practice was to merge with or to purchase
outright companies producing complementary lines of farm implements. Inter-
national Harvester purchased firms making tillage equipment, and Deere and
Company expanded in seeding and harvesting lines.
1
Ibid
. , 12.
Ibid
.
, l^t-.
13
Shortly after 1915, the full-line firm had emerged as the major form of
organization in the agricultural implements industry. The era of mergers came
to a close with the ending of World War I and a court consent decree in 1918
against International Harvester Company.
Seller Concentration
During this early stage of development, the trend in the number of estab-
lishments was first an increase and then a decline (Table I). Between 1859
and 1919 the number of establishments declined from 2,116 to 521. The sharp-
est drop came between 1879 and 1889 when the number dropped from 1,943 to 910,
a 53 per cent decline.
TABLE I
GROWTH OF THE MANUFACTURE OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS
ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS REPORTS, 1849 - 1914
NUMBER OF CAPITAL TOTAL VALUE
YEAR ESTABLISHMENTS INVESTED OF PRODUCT
1849 1,333 $ 3,564,202 $ 6,842,611
1859 2,116
'
13,866,389 20,831,904
1869 2,076 34,834,600 52,066,875
1879 1,943 62,109,668 68,640,486
1889 910 145,313,997 81,271,651
1899 715 157,707,951 101,207,428
1904 648 196,740,700 112,007,344
1909 640 256,281,000 146,329,268
1914 601 338,531.673 164,086,835
1919 521 366,962,052 304,961,256
SOURCE: U. S. Federal Trade Commission. Report on the Causes of High
Prices of Farm Implements. (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Govenrment Printing
Office, May 4, 1920), p. 43.
V*
The factors causing this trend were fighting the Civil War, settling of
the western states, and improving transportation. The Civil War and the
accompanying good crop years caused a shortage of farm labor. The new harvesting
machines provided the farmer with a low cost substitute; consequently, the
demand for the machines was good. Holders of patents on the harvester machines,
such as McCormick, sold rights to other producers for the right to manufacture
his machine. This practice resulted in a large number of establishments.
Selling rights were feasible because of the transportation problem. Following
the Civil War, trasportation improved, but the grain producing area was expand-
ing westward, a fact which led to firms opening shops nearer the new producing
areas, thus accounting for the slower rate of decline in establishments between
1859 and 18?9.
During the 1890' s, the market stablized. This affected competition in
the implement industry in three ways: (1) it decreased the importance of
spatial competiton, (2) it brought about the disappearance of many small firms
which had previously produced on contract with larger holders of key patents,
and (3) it induced manufacturers to take a long critical look at their distri-
3butive organization.
At the beginning of the twentieth centruy, the transportation system had
developed to such an extent that centralized production employing large plants
was profitable. In 1902, the era of mergers began with the forming of the
International Harvester Company. This combination brought under single control
90 per cent of the trade in grain binders and 80 per cent of the trade in
mowers for the United States. The company in the year following acquired three
more important producers of harvesting machinery to increase their share of the
3Ibid. . 12.
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market: D. M. Osborne and Company, Aultmen-Miller Company, and Minnie
Harvester Company.
Publicly the reason given for the mergers was that the competition during
the harvester war was adverse to the public interest. However, the Bureau of
Corporations 1912 report on International Harvester observed that although
competition in the pre-amalgamation period had been keen it had not been as
ruinous as the companies had claimed.
In 1911, Deere and Company became the second largest equipment producer
in the U. S. Its growth came by acquisition, consolidation, and the expansion
of its own plants. Again the competitive nature of the industry was restricted
by reducing the number of establishments.
What about the size distribution? Referring to Table I, one can see that
the trend in size of establishments was toward larger units. In 1859, the
investment per company was just over $6,500 and by 191^, this had jumped to
over $563,000 per establishment, of course the value of the dollar also changed.
The trend towards larger units follows from the trend of centralized production
established by the larger amalgamated companies.
At the founding, International Harvester Company had essentially a monopo-
listic position with 85 per cent of the total output in the harvesting machinery
business. The Bureau of Corporations noted in 191^ that the "monopolistic"
position of the International Harvester Company in harvesting machines was
maintained, while it controlled a considerable and increasing percentage of the
business in new lines.
Ibid., lb ,
Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Corporation. The International
Harvester Company
.
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1913) p. 66.
6
Ibid.
16
The single most important external factor affecting the competitive
nature of the industry sharted in 191^- as a result of the report by the Bureau
of Corporations. The International Harvester Company was charged with viola-
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and in August of 191^t was ordered separated
and divided among at least three substantially equal, separate, distinct, and
independent corporations with wholly separate owners and stockholders. The
company argued its case in court until 1918, when a joint consent decree which
modified the original decree was handed down. This action discouraged futher
attempts to corner the market. In summary, seller concentration by the end of
1919 was highly concentrated and the industry would be classified as a type I
oligopoly using Richard Caves' classification.
Buyer Concentration
The primary means of distribution in the farm equipment industry since
its beginning has been through an independent dealer organization. In the
1800' s the machinery was manufactured close to the agricultural producing areas
where only a small marketing organization was required. During the harvester
war of the 1890's, the dealer organization was developed to the point where
there were four or more per town; a competitive relationship developed as a
result. Also, to offer a complete line of machines to the farmer, the dealer
handled products from several manufacturers, a process which complicated the
dealer's business still -more.
With the forming of the International Harvester Company and the subsequent
full-line manufacturers, the dealers became more dependent on a single manufac-
turer. Manufacturers practiced full-line forcing where the dealers could sell
only those products manufactured by the full-line manufacturer and this practice
hindered the dealer in his selection of merchandise.
17
In fact after the amalgamation of the harvester companies, International
Harvester Company maintained a dual system of dealers. Each system of dealers
sold a different brand name: McCormick and Deering. This organization evolved
because before the merger each of the harvesting companies had its own dealer-
ship organization and after consolidation Harvester wanted to get maximum pene-
tration of the market.
The system of dual dealers was ended by a consent decree of the courts in
1918, enjoining the company from having more than one agent or representative
in any city or town in the United States for the sale of its harvesting mach-
inery or other implements. The immediate effect was a drastic reduction in
the number of International Harvester dealers, from 21,800 in 1917 to 13,860
in 1919. 7
The competition between dealers was intense. Seme manufacturers and
wholesalers of farm machinery did not sell solely through dealers; these firms
could sell at a lower cost. This practice was the chief cause for the organi-
zation of dealers' associations. One of the first was the Kansas dealers
association, founded in 1889. Farm machinery dealers association sought from
the beginning to discourage the practice of price cutting. In some instances,
certain small associations attempted to fix the prices at which their members
should sell. Later, the principal associations gave considerable attention to
the possibility of securing greater harmony among competing dealers by organizing
9
local clubs. These organizations apparently had little success in fixing prices.
7
Phillips, The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada , p. 18
Q
U. S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Corporations, Farm Machinery Trade
Associations
.
(Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1915) P» 9.
9Ibid. . 11.
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The size distribution of the dealer organization is not available. How-
ever, the volume of business per dealer must have been increasing with the
number of dealers decreasing as noted by the Harvester example and the value
of shipments by the industry increasing from six million in 1849 to 304 million
in 1919 or over 5000 per cent increasing in sales.
TABLE 2
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS (including- tractors) — NUMBER OF
ESTABLISHMENTS AND VALUE OF PRODUCTS BIANNUAL — 1921 to 1939
CENSUS YEAR NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS VALUE OF PRODUCTS ($1,000)
1921 353 $163,817
1923 312 151,286
1925 303 169,468
1927 277 202,732
1929 293 277,854
1931 250 168,318
1933 194- 64,951
1935 241 291,254
1937 298 587,341
1939 347 421,847
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of Census. Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1932 . 1940 . and 1942. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office),
1932, p. 752; 1940, p. 831; and 1942, p. 913.
The trade area of the dealership was the approximate size of a county
or smaller. Thus the relative size between the manufacturer and its franchised
dealers had gone in favor of the manufacturer in this pre-World War I develop-
ment stage. This resulted in the dealer being weak in price dealings with the
manufacturer. But the dealer could switch to another manufacturer as an alter-
native
.
19
What is the relative relationship between the farmer and the dealer? Here
again for this era data is not available. The Bureau of the Census published
the number of farms for the year 1900, 1910, and 1920 but no data on farm mach-
inery dealers. Comparison of the number of manufacturers with the number of
farmers is not possible because the Census of Manufacture is available only for
the years cited in Table I.
i
Product Differentiation
The early farm machines were differentiated mainly by quality, and the
importance early manufacturers placed on patent rights points this out, Phillips
noted, "Patent disputes began early. In 1850 McCormick brought suit against
Seymour and Morgan, one of the earliest producers of the McCormick machine on
contract, and was awarded victory in 185^ • . • • hundreds of suits and counter-
suits marked the era."
Attempts to install buyer preference were tried early. Phillips cites an
example of rivalry between McCormick and Hussey, the first successful reapers.
Up and down the seaboard states the two reapers
were matched repeatedly in field trials and public
exhibits. Both inventors bombarded the press with
claims of superiority for their own machines and with
belittling comments about the rival. The campaign
doubtless provided good advertising for the rivals,
and for the idea of mechanical graincutting but its
results were highly inconclusive as far as the respec-
tive merits of the two machines were concerned.
H
During this early period real and false product differences existed.
Phillips, The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada
, p. 5»
Ibid .. 4.
20
The importance of product differentiation in the incorporation phase is
illustrated by the practice followed by the International Harvester Company.
After 1912, when the McCormick and Deering lines had become established as the
leading sellers, the company was still marketing harvesting machinery under
the names of McCormick, Deering, Champion, Buckeye, Milwaukee, and Osborne.
It hesitated to abandon the trade names formerly used by its constituents for
fear of losing buyers who through habit or conviction had become attached to
one of them.
Barriers to Entry
New firms entering the farm equipment industry encountered disadvantages
in four areas: (1) established preferences of buyers, (2) determination of
prices, (3) cost of production, and (4) distribution of products. New firms
did experience favorable conditions when new products using new technology
was their motive for entering the market. Henry Ford introduced the Fordson
tractor in 1917 and won wide acceptance with his low priced ($885) small
13
tractor. This was Henry Ford's first attempt at large scale production of
farm equipment.
Established perferences tend to limit the size of the market for new
sellers. The buying pattern played an important part in International Har-
vester's decision to continue merchandising under six brand names after its
founding in 1902. Conant observed.
12
Ibid .. 18.
13Ibid
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When, through large selling expenses consumer's
preferences for the products of one or a few long-line
firms are established, overcoming these preferences
may be one formidable barrier to the entry of new firms
into the field. This can be illustrated by the detailed
selling expense for 1918.-^
Conant also pointed out the fact that larger producers determine general prices
for. the industry. A smaller firm wishing to set a price different from the
general one must consider his ability to differentiate his product and the
reactions of the larger firms to his price move.
Economies of scale were enjoyed by the large full-line manufacturers in
production and distribution. The Federal Trade Commission's 1920 Report on
the Causes of High Prices of Farm Equipment Implements showed in a comparison
of the total cost of the McCormick harvesting machines with the harvesting
machines of five other manufacturers that the McCormick line had the lowest
cost. A five-foot mower,' in 1916, in the McCormick line cost $27.72 and the
next company's cost was $31.24 for a difference of $3.52. The difference in
manufacturing costs on a corn binder was $16.77 in 1916 and $40.76 in 1918.
This advantage explains part of the dominant position that International
Harvester had in the manufacturing of harvesting machinery.
The established distribution system for farm implements was through
company-owned branch wholesale operations for the full-line firms and through
independent wholesalers for the smaller manufacturers. The independent dealer
then purchased from the manufacturers or independent wholesalers or both. The
14
Michael Conant. "Aspects of Monopoly and Price Policies in the Farm
Machinery Industry Since 1902." ^Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Chicago, 1949), p. 33.
15
Ibid., 92.
U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Causes of High Prices of
Farm Implements
, p. 669.
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full-line manufacturers carried on a policy to get the best dealers in each
community, which meant the short-line manufacturers and new firms had to use
less desirable outlets or dealers. The farmer having an established purchasing
pattern of buying from the dealer organization was not always willing to try
new sources of supply.
In summary, the pre-World War I era saw in the farm machinery industry
the birth of a new industry which in rapid fashion took on monopolistic char-
acteristics in the International Harvester Company. The court order in 191^
did much to cut monopoly profits enjoyed by this firm, but the firm continued to
to dominate sales and maintain lower costs of production. Harvester was losing
its share of the market in 1919, but remained the leader. The Federal Trade
Commission went on record to state that the court dissolution was not sufficient
and wanted still stronger measures to bring about a condition of competition in
17
the harvesting machine lines.
The market power was shifting toward the manufacturer. The dealer was
increasing his influence on the farmer, and the manufacturer was gaining a
greater degree of control over the dealers.
l7
Ibid., p. 680
III. 1920 TO 1939 THE TRACTOR REVOLUTION
During the inter-war years, the industry experienced the rapid acceptance
by farmers of new technological developments and the competition between firms
for the acceptance of new products caused several alterations in the market
structure of the industry. The International Harvester Company lost part of
its share of the market, new full-line manufacturers entered the market, and a
new merchandising technique was tried. Also, the industry's profits followed
farm income, an event which resulted in the entering and exiting for firms.
Seller Concentration
The degree of seller concentration underwent changes as indicated by the
number of manufacturers producing the share of the market held by full-line
producers. The number of establishments generally declined until after 1933,
when only 19^ establishments produced farm implements. After this depression
year, the number of manufacturers increased until in 1939 there were 3^7 es-
tablishments, just six less than in 1921. The entry and exit of firms tended
to follow the business cycle. In 1929, when general business conditions were
good the number of establishments increased. But, the number dropped in 1931
to below the 1927 density (Table 2). Short-line manufacturers accounted for
the increase in establishments after 1933*
Full-line manufacturers increased their share of the total farm machinery
sales during this period, but there were more full-line manufacturers to split
the market. Michael Conant's study estimated these portions, but they are
subject to a considerable margin of error because domestic sales data are not
normally published by firms. However, the market share of the full-line pro-
ducers did increase between 1922 and 1937. Michael Conant listed four full-
21*
line firms in 1922, and seven in 1937. This misrepresents the importance of
large manufacturers because Ford Motor Company had 80 per cent of the tractor
sales in 1922 and is not included as a full-line firm because Ford did not
produce a full-line of implements. Ford discontinued tractor production in
the United States in 1928. The Federal Trade Commission's 1938 report listed
eight full-line manufacturers, which included the original seven plus B. F.
Avery and Sons Company.
Market shares of the full-line manufacturers were unstable. Allis
Chalmers was seventh in the industry in 1929 and grew to third by 1939.
International Harvester was continuing to lose its market position. These
changes in portion of sales reflects the firm's ability or inability to Compete
in new technological developments and imporvements . Although Harvester dom-
inated the harvesting lines, the company was losing its market position because
these machines were not the principal product of the industry. Allis Chalmers
grew because of its new products: the WC tractors and the "all crop" combines.
These products found wide acceptance because they were smaller units which the
small farmers could use more effectively and profitably.
Phillips
, The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada
, p. 25.
2
Federal Trade Commission. Report on the Agricultural Implement and Mach-
inery Industry
.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938lp7Il,
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED SHARE IN DOMESTIC FARM
MACHINERY SALES BY FULL-LINE PRODUCERS
25
FIRM 1922 1929 1937 1948
Total, full-line firms
International Harvester
Deere and Co.
J. I. Case
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.
Oliver Corp.
Minneapolis-Moline Co.
Massey-Harris Co.
Dearborn Motor Corp.
64.6 54.7 42.6 73.7
44.0 28.3 32.7 22.8
11.6 11.9 18.5 15.3
9.0 3.8 4.8 7.0
1.8 8.1 6.9
4.7 4.8 4.2
2.5 2.7 . 3.6
1.7 1.0 3.8
10.2
SOURCE: Michael Conant, "Competition in the Farm Machinery Industry",
Journal of Business of the University of Chicago , (January, 1953). P» 27.
Another example of the part new technology played in market structure
changes was the Fordson tractor. Henry Ford produced the first Fordson in 1917
and by 1923 had sold 80 per cent of the tractors in the United States. He did
not modify the original model to any great extent, nor did he manufacture a
matching line of implements. In 1925. the *ordson reached its peak sales and
then declined until production was stopped in 1928. Conant concludes that the
Fordson failed because Ford refused to recognize that constant innovation was
3
the key to success.'
3
Conant, 6l.
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The Federal Trade Commission's 1938 report noted:
"The fact that, for many important farm implements
and machines, not to exceed four to six large long-line
manufacturers produce and sell from 80 to 100 per cent
of the total sold in the United States, in itself con-
stitutes a situation under which the competitive acts
of individual large companies may have highly restric-
tive effects upon the business of smaller manufacturers ^
and tend to weaken competition among the large companies."
For example, in 1936 five full-line companies manufactured 95.8 per cent of
the grain and rice binders produced in the United States, Four full-line
t
companies manufactured 100 per cent of the horse or tractor-drawn corn binders,'
This highly concentrated industry did not have interlocking directorates.
Of the 183 companies reviewed in the Federal Trade Commission's 1938 report, .
only one instance was recorded in which the same individual was a director in
two companies, owning 50 shares in one company and one share in the other.
The short-line manufacturers maintained their important position in the
industry. The late 1920 's saw several full-line companies organized by combin-
ing small manufacturers: Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company and Oliver Farm
Equipment Company, The increase in the number of establishments in 1937 shown
in Table 2 represents more short-line manufacturers.
The size of these short-line companies varied. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion's 1938 report covered 138 companies, only twelve of which had investments
of between one and three million dollars. Small manufacturers were able to
maintain their competitive positions because of their low overhead and their
flexibility in meeting new technology. Also, their transportation costs were
4
Federal Trade Commission Report, 1938, p. 20.
5Ibid., 147
6
Ibid.. 16.
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lower than those of the full-line manufacturers because they shipped short
distances to serve their local market whereas the larger firms manufacture their
products primarily in the Western Great Lakes area.
Mail-order houses expanded into the farm equipment industry during this
era. These firms attempted to sell machinery and repair parts through catalogs,
but soon found selling to farmers via this medium was difficult because farmers
wanted to see and handle the item before making a purchase. Also, mail-order
houses could not provide service to farmers. Montgomery-Ward and Sears-
Roebuck and Company were the largest of these firms, and they essentially
discontinued efforts to sell implements by the late 1930*s. Farm supplies and
some repair parts were maintained by the mail-order houses but as an important
factor in the industry the mail-order house was out by 1935.^
Buyer Concentration
Farm equipment dealers in number followed the trend in farm implement
sales. In 1929 when sales were up, so was the dealer population; in 1935, when
sales hit a low for the depression years, dealer numbers also decreased. This
trend is reflected in Table 4 below. This table on the number of dealers and
the sales volume includes implement and hardware dealers. But there is no
evidence to support the idea that the mix of the two types changed greatly
during the period which would distort the data. Census data is available for
only the years listed.
7
-Ibid.. 139.
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The number of farms declined from 6,448,343 in .1920 to 6,096,799 in 1940.
During the depression years, the number of farms increased but their number did
not reach the 1920 level. The size distribution shifted towards larger units.
In 1920, 23.1 per cent of the land was in farms with 1,000 acres or more; in
o
1940, there was 34.3 per cent in this category.
TABLE 4
FARM IMPLEMENT, TRACTOR, AND HARDWARE DEALERS
IN THE UNITED STATES — NUMBER OF STORES AND SALES
YEAR NUMBER OF DEALERS SALES ($1,000)
1929 12,242 $518,507
1935 9,637 291,762
1939 10,499 3^,433
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
1942
.
Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 194377 P. 966.
During the 1920 to 1940 period the trend in market power relationships
within the industry was mixed. The full-line manufacturers as a group increased
their share of the market sales volume, but the number of full-line manufacturers
doubled from four to eight. The short-line manufacturers experienced a growth
in their number in the late 1930's, but the percentage of the sales volume
accounted for by this group declined. The mail-order house came and went. The
dealers were still subject to the manufacturers price policy, and their number
changed with the trend of farm equipment sales.
Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1942, p. 674.
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Ibid.
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Product Differentiation
Product differentiation continued as an important dimension of the market
structure of the farm equipment industry. The primary emphasis was on customer
service, brand names, and quality. The lack of customer service was a major
factor in the failure of mail order houses to become established in the in-
dustry. They depend on the lower price made possible by the elimination of
personal salesiren, trade-ins, credit extensions and follow-up services to sell
these products. They did use some retail outlets, but had to increase prices
above the catalog prices in these stores. The farmer's dependence on the
services which the mail-order houses left out was sufficient to force these
firms out of the market. The price of the machine that a farmer purchased in-
cluded the services related to product. The farmer must have then expected to
pay for these services if he wanted them. ~
Brand names were evident in the industry. In a study designed to investi-
gate the distribution methods for twenty-one manufacturers of agricultural
implements, the advertising cost per one hundred dollars cost of implements was
$1.31. This practice tends to establish customer preference, and the manu-
facturers can differentiate prices and compete in nonprice factors. However,
price competition was important during this era, as demonstrated by the Fordson
Tractor manufactured by the Ford Motor Company and by the Allis Chalmers Manufac-
turing Company's "all-crop" combine.
Major changes in the quality of products caused much of the instability
in market shares. For example Allis-Chalmers in 1929 had 1.8 per cent of
domestic sales and by 1937 their share was 8.1 per cent. During this time, two
U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Distribution Methods and Costs
(Washington, D. C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2, 19^), p. 17oT~
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innovations to old product lines were introduced by the company: the 5-foot
"all-crop" combine and the rubber tired tractor. This quality aspect of the
products forces companies to introduce new and improved products periodically
and results in increased cost associated with the production changes. This
practice of periodic changes results in higher prices being paid by the farmer,
but this has resulted in more efficient machines. The all-purpose tractor of
International Harvester Company in 1924 was an example of more efficient
machines being introduces.
Barriers to Entry
Entry of new firms into the industry had two aspects during this era.
One was the process of short-line producers becoming a full-line producer and
the second was ability of short-line manufacturers to enter the market. Firms
were able to enter industry at both the above levels. During 1928 and 1929
four new full-line manufacturers were organized by the mergers or acquisition
of short-line manufacturers: the Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, the
Oliver Farm Equipment Company, the B. F. Avery and Sons Company and the Massey-
Harris Manufacturing Company. The marked increase in farm implement manufact-
uring establishments from 1935 to 1937 was entirely new short-line manufacturers.
The competition between the short-line and long-line manufacturers for
dealers was the main obstacle in the growth path of small manufacturers. The
full-line companies were more attractive to independent dealers because the
larger companies furnished the dealers with an almost complete line of machinery
and a tractor. A dealer needed a tractor to sell in order to generate
Phillips , The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada , p. 33
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sufficient volume to warrent his staying in operation. Also, a major portion
of farm equipment sales were credit sales, first to the dealer and then to the
farmer. This requirement for capital could not be overcome by many short-line
firms, and dealers often would not sell the smaller company's products for
this reason.
The relative cost of production between the long and short-line companies
varied. The distribution costs of short-line companies were lower, but they
used wholesalers and jobbers because the narrow selection of products did not
offer sufficient volume to warrent a sales force.
Mail-order houses tried to circumvent the established distribution channels
and were not successful. These firms orginally distributed farm implements and
parts through separate farm implement catalogs. Later these catalogs were
supplemental with retail outlets. However, with the increased use of mechanized
farm equipment, involving heavier, and more complex implements and machines, the
role of the mail-order houses as distributors was limited. In 1939 t a few were
still operating but these had specialized in one or a few items. The mail-
order houses' main disadvantages were the lack of service facilities, the
necessity of shipping farm implements in a knocked-down form, the lack of dis«- - •
12
play, and the lack of easy credit terms,
OTHER STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
Price leadership was the accepted pricing policy of farm equipment
industry. International Harvester Company and Deere and Company were the pace
setters in the industry in the establishment of prices and in the granting of
12
Federal Trade Commission Report, 1938, p. 139.
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terms of sales to dealers. This price leadership policy was facilitated and
made possible by extensive exchanges of prices among individual manufacturers.
"It was claimed, however, that most exchanges are not made until prices have
13
been definitely decided upon and published to the trade."
With the mechanization of farms the capital structure of the farm equip-
ment industry changes. The investment per company increased and the return on
investment declined. The 1939 Federal Trade Commission Report showed that for
the manufacturers reporting the average return on investment was 11.39 per
cent for the years 1913 to 1918 inclusive. Then from 1929 to 1936 the average
Ik
return on investment was 7.98 per cent. Part of the difference between the
two periods was due to the general economic conditions of agriculture, but most
of the difference was caused by the changes in the market structure of the
industry.
13
Ibid., 21.
l4
Ibid., 39^.
IV. 1940 - 1959
During the twenty-year span between 19^0 and 1959 the market for farm
equipment went through three phases and in each phase changes occured in the
market structure of the industry. During World War II, the first phase, the
production of farm machinery was curtailed sharply by government controls on
the use of steel. The industry experienced a "seller's market" after the war
when the industry over-expanded. In 1953 t the "seller's market" ended and the
sale of farm equipment stabilized.
In 19^2, farm machinery prices were frozen along with prices of other
commodities, remaining unchanged until 1946. The rationing of steel during
this. period favored the small manufacturers of farm equipment. These firms
often received the same volume of steel during the war years as they had used
in prior years. This steel allowed them to maintain their market share and
their number increased. In 1939 f there were 317 establishments manufacturing
farm machinery; in 19^7 1 this number had increased to 1,102. These figures
included full-line manufacturers, but it is evident most of the increase was in
short-line firms.
In 1946, the price freeze was lifted and the rush was on. Farmers had
experienced profitable years during and following the war. Machines were wear-
ing out from continuous use and new machines were in limited supply. Contrary
to expected price rises, on March 8, 1947, International Harvester Company
2
announced price reductions on about one half of its machines. Other firms
followed the price cut and Michael Conant noted the reason why the member firms
Statistical Abstract of the United States
. 1952, p. 829.
2
Conant, p. 74.
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followed price reductions. "The high cross elasticity of demand between
Harvester products and those of other firms plus the possibility of renewed
pairing of buyers and sellers after the machinery backlog was filled made rival
firms hesitate in raising prices even though capacity output could have been
3
sold at higher prices."
During this phase, a system of allocating production to dealers was
developed by full-line manufacturers. This system hastened complaints from
dealers because the manufacturers could not fill the allocations. Labor strikes
at the plants and steel shortages slowed the flow of machinery and as a result,
many dealers suffered extreme financial embarrasment.
In the spring of 1953, the seller's market ended with inventories present
on dealer's lots for the first time since the early 19^0's. Farmers were faced
with reduced prices causing the demand for new machines to slackened. This
stabilizing of the market caused many dealers to go out of business and the
full-line manufacturers to tighten their belts.
Seller Concentration
Major changes in seller concentration occurred in two areas of importance.
The full-line manufacturers increased their market share as a group, but an-
other full-line firm developed and most of the old line firms underwent major
revisions. The second element of change was an increase in the number of
companies in the industry.
The precise change in full-line manufacturers* market shares is not avail-
able. Michael Conant illustrated the change between 1937 and 19^8, (Table 3).
3Ibid.. 75.
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The percentage of the value of shipments by the industry accounted for by the
full-line manufacturers increased from 72.6 per cent in 1937 to 73.7 per cent
in 19^8. International Harvester Company's share of the shipments declined
from 32.7 per cent in 1937 to 22.8 in 19^8. Dearborn Motor Corporation entered
the market and accounted for 10.2 per cent of the total shipment. Four of the
smaller full-line firms increased their position, whereas International Harvester
Company and Deere and Company, the industry's leaders, both declined. This
shift shows that although there was a definite trend towards increasing the
concentration in the full-line manufacturers, the concentration within any one
company was declining during the first part of this period.
Concentration continued high during the 1950' s with Deere and Company
passing International Harvester Company to become the leader in dollar volume
in the United States. But, the degree of concentration is best discussed by
dividing the industry into product groups (Table 5).
In 1958, the eight largest companies accounted for only 58 per cent of
the total shipments of farm machinery and equipment. But, when considering
product groups the eight largest companies in the industry had increased their .
control. The eight largest manufacturers of wheel tractors and parts cohtroled
96 per cent of market. This industry was very highly concentrated.
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TABLE 5
PER CENT OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS OF FARM MACHINERY AND
EQUIPMENT AND SELECTED PRODUCT GROUPS ACCOUNTED
FOR BY THE LARGEST COMPANIES
PRODUCT GROUPS
PER CENT OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS ACCOUNTED FOR BY
k Largest 8 Largest 20 Largest 50 Largest
Companies Companies Companies Companies
Farm Machinery and
Equipment 44 58 68 77
Wheel Tractor and
Parts 72 96 99 99+
Planting, Seeding &
Fertilizing Mach. 63 76 89 97
Harvesting Machinery 70 81 92 98
Haying Machinery 72 84 97 99
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census Report for the Subcommittee of
Anti-trust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary United States
Senate, Concentration Rations in Manufacturing Industry 1958 . (Washington,duri .
,
1962),'D. C.i U. S. Government Printing Office, Part I pp. 148-149.
At the end of the 1930' s, the number of establishments manufacturing
farm machinery and equipment increased, and this trend continued into the
post-war period. The important change here is that these new establishments
were short-line manufacturers (Table 6). Because the 1958 Census of Manufact-
urers redefined the classification of farm machinery and equipment industry,
earlier data are not comparable. But for 1958, over one fourth of the estab-
lishments employed less than five employees. "Establishments" and "companies"
are not interchangable terms for reporting census data; however, the difference
between the two classification terms does not distract from the fact that small
short-line manufacturers accounted for the increase.
TABLE 6
FARM MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT ESTABLISHMENTS
BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE: 1958 AND 1963
37
ITEM 1958 1963
Percentage
Change
Companies Total 1,389 1,481 +6.6
Establishments Total 1,469 1,568 + 6.7
1 to 4 employees 485 526 + 8.5
5 to 9 employees 258 237 - 7.4
10 to 19 employees 217 247 +13.8
20 to 49 employees 241 264 +8.3
50 to 99 employees 110 143 +30.0
100 to 249 employees 91 80 -12.1
250 to 499 employees 24 30 +25.0
500 to 999 employees 21 21
1,000 to 2,499 employees 14 12 -14.3
2,500 employees and over 8 8
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of Census: Census of Manufacturers 1958 , I963 ,
(Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 35A-9 and 35A-11.
Buyer Concentration
Following World War II , the number of farm equipment dealers increased.
A survey of dealers in Louisiana found that about 40 per cent of the firms that
were in business in i960 started between 1940 and 1949. The United States
Census of Business shows the largest number of dealers for 1958 with 19,008
(Table 7). However, there is evidence that this data does not represent the
Floyd L. Corty and Richard G. Morrison, "The Retail Farm Equipment Bus-
iness in Louisiana" Bulletin No. 558. Lousiana State University Agricultural
Experiment Station, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station,
October, 1962), p. 33.
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true trend in the number of dealers. First, the Bureau of the Census defines
farm equipment dealers as "Establishments primarily selling farm tractors,
repears, mowers, plows, wagons, and related farm equipment. w3 The "primary"
aspect of this definition accounts for some of the increase in 1958. Because
of the trend towards larger farm equipment dealers, a few dealers were reclass-
ified from categories such as hardware stores and new car dealers. Second, a
study by C. J. Fliginger of farm equipment retailing in South Dakota found that
10 per cent of the sample dealers suspended operations during 1955* The de-
crease in the number of farm equipment dealers probably started soon after 1953
when the post-war sales boom ended, but no facts are available to support this
conclusion.
Interesting also is the manufacturer with the greatest number of dealers.
Fliginger' s study noted that the manufacturer having the largest number of
retail outlets in South Dakota was International Harvester Company, followed
7by Deere and Company and J, I. Case Manufacturing Company.
-'U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Business 1958 . (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 196l), p. APP-3.
C. John Fliginger, "Farm Equipment Retailing in South Dakota", Agri-
cultural Economics Pamphlet No. 74, South Dakota State College (College Station,
S. .D.i South Dakota State College, July, 1956), p. 7.
7Ibid., 8.
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TABLE 7
FARM EQUIPMENT DEALERS: NUMBER AND SALES
1948, 1954, 1958 AND 1963
YEAR NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS SALES ($1,000)
1963 16,362 3,626,072
1958 19,008 3,185.715
1954 18,689 2,804,532
1948 17.509 2,385,963
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Business 1948 , 1954 ,
1958 . and 1963 . (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 1-7.
The size of each retail establishment grew during the 1950's, The study
by Corty and Morrison found that between 1950 and 1959 about two-thirds of the
dealers had enlarged the size of their establishments, added new lines of
merchandise, or increased the number of employees. The average investment of
Q
the 21^ retail farm equipment firms studied in Louisiana was $121,500.
Fliginger in South Dakota noted that in one area of the state over 75
per cent of the dealers had gross sales over $100,000 and in another 69.7
per cent of the firms had sales greater than $250,000 and only 2.1 per cent had
gross sales greater than $500,000.
The trade area served by a retail dealer varied between sectors of the
United States and areas within a state. In South Dakota, the more heavily pop-
ulated the areas the smaller the dealers 1 size and trade area tended to be.
Corty and Morrison, 18.
9Ibid .. 28.
10
Fliginger, 8.
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The average radius of the trade area in that state was 32.5 miles. In
12
Louisiana, the average trade area had a radius of 23 miles. The geographical
characteristics account for the difference in trade area radii for the two
states.
The competitive relationships between the dealer and the manufacturer is
almost nonexistent. The contracts between dealers and manufacturer restricts
13
the dealer to price bargaining to within the dealer's normal volume discounts.
However, in some instances dealers have dropped the franchise of one manufac-
turer and signed with another manufacturer.
Dealers contended in South Dakota that their own line dealers were the
toughest to compete with. Their reasoning was that "when the farmer decided to
purchase, he first decided what line of machinery he wanted. Then, he went to
different dealers of that line and compared prices, putting dealers against
Ik
dealers against dealer on trade-in allowances and price." Thus, the dealer
is placed in a cost price squeeze in which the manufacturers established the
cost of machines and competition with member dealers for the farmer's machinery
dollar resulted in lower selling prices for the dealer.
Product Differentiation
Rapid technological obsolescence of machines over shadowed attempts at
product differentiation. Tractors built in 1950 did not provide that same
productive service as those built in 1959. The company that provided the new
nibid.
12
Corty and Morrison, p. 10.
13^
Fliginger, p. 13.
14
Ibid. . 20.
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units with more power and versatility quickly replaced the old established
company. For example, Deere and Company displaced International Harvester
Company as number one in domestic sales in the late 1950's.
Standardization of products was one of the leading functions of trade
associations in the industry. The marketing of many sizes and styles of a
given machine was considered by the full-line firms to add more to costs than
to revenues. The standardization policies seemed to have little effect on the
marketing of farm machinery because the large dollar volume machinery items
such as tractors and combines are subject to rapidly changing technology.
The service provided at the dealer's door was the primary factor that
differentiated the product of one manufacturer from that of another. The vast
increase in the mechanization of farms caused the farmer to depend on repairs
and services supplied by the dealer. When a combine breaks down during the
harvesting season, the farm operator wants repairs quickly and will patronize
the dealer that can supply the needed parts. With the system of franchized
dealers, the farmer tends to purchase the machines sold by the dealer who pro-
vides the best service.
An example of the importance of the dealer's service to the farmer and
manufacturer occurred in 1958 when Ford Motor Company introduced its Model 6000,
the largest domestic tractor at that time. The company merchandised the tractor
aggressively and sold several units. But, when Model 6000 went into continuous
use, "it just went to pieces, to such an extent that the company finally came
out with a policy whereby a reengineered and redesigned tractor of like power
was given to each customer who owned the tractor with the product difficulty,
and the unsatisfactory tractor was taken. back either into the distributor's place
Conant, Journal of Business
, p. 29.
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of business or the dealer's place of business and repaired in accord with a
program laid down by the Ford Motor Company, and then we offered them to our
customers as rebuilt tractors." Without a system containing a dealer service
organization this operation would have cost the company considerably to ship
the units back to the factory. The farmer would have lost the use of a tractor
had not the dealer been able to service it for him while Ford Motor Company
developed their policy on replacement and rebuilding.
Cromarty noted that "Manufacturers cannot afford to not stock parts since
farmers' decisions to buy machinery are in part determined by the willingness
17
of manufacturers to supply repair parts in subsequent years."
A new dimension of dealer service that recieved considerable attention
was renting or leasing of farm equipment by the dealer to local farmers. The
T ft
proclaimed advantages of the practice are as follows:
(1) the machinery dealer can put his new and used
equipment to work when sales are low,
(2) the dealers are making available to farmers
machines that the farmers could not generally
afford to use,
(3) the farmer can free his capital to expand his
operation elsewhere.,
(4) the farmer can make his operation more respon-
sive to productive requirements.
Opponents of the rental practice contend that the capital requirements
for a dealer make the practice unfeasible. The typical equipment dealer has
neither sufficient capital nor the required number of machines to stock a
U. S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small Business,
Ford Tractor Distributors 88 Congress, 2nd Session, February 10, 1964, (Wash-
ington, D. C: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 153.
7Cromarty, 34.
1 ft *
"Bouquest and Brickbats Greet the Farm Machine Rental Plan," Co-op
Grain Quarterly 16 (May, 1958), p. 66.
*3
wide selection. Also, the service charge sufficient to be profitable to the
19
dealer would cost the farmer more than the conventional means. '
The rental or leasing program was in limited use. Corty and Morrison's
I960 study of Louisiana dealers found that 10 per cent of the equipment dealers
20
were leasing out equipment for demonstration or to meet a farming emergency.
The future use of rental machines by farmers will be limited. However, as
tractors and machines become more expensive, leasing arrangments between manu-
facturers or some leasing company will become popular. The extent of the devel-
opment of this practice as a dimension of the dealer's operation will become
more important.
Barriers to Entry
Earlier in this chapter it has been noted that the number of short-line
manufacturers had increased markedly between 19^0 and 1959. What conditions
were present that permitted "this expansion? There are two primary reasons
why these small firms increased in number: an expanding market and their
competitive positions. The sellers' market after World War II and the ability
of small manufacturers to get steel during the war to meet this market was
favorable to them.
These short-line manufacturers enjoyed a limited competitive advantage
producing speciality items within a limited market. The volume was not suffic-
ient for the full-line manufacturers to supply. The difference in farming
practices between agricultural producing areas increased the need for these
special localized machines.
19Ibid .. 68.
20Corty and Morrison, p. 33.
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Also, the small manufacturer had cost advantages over local areas as a
study in Texas showed that the freight on implements exceeds the freight on
21
steel into that area. Because the major centers of production for agri-
cultural machinery are in the Western Great Lakes States this difference in
freight rates encouraged the local producers. These small family firms had
lower overhead and used cheaper labor, which, when combined with the other cost
advantages, gave the small manufacturer a competitive advantage over a limited
market for special products.
However, expansion by these firms beyond certain effective barriers will
bring complications of a physical, economic, and social nature. As they approach
the existing implement producing centers, competition with them becomes greater.
As shipments leave the area of origin, rail traffic changes, transit time
increases, and interline shipments become more common. Also, there is a tendency
in the farm machinery market for farmers to favor local manufacturers ; and as a
manufacturer extends his territory, the less loyalty he will find towards his
product.
For potential full-line manufacturers, the conditions of entry remained
almost the same as during the 1920 *s and 1930' s when full-line firms developed
during boom periods. During the sellers' market. Ford Motor Company expanded
its operations in farm equipment and the Cockshutt Farm Equipment of Canada,
Limited expanded its operations into the United States. After the backlog of
demand for new machines was filled in 1953t these full-line companies experienced
some hard times. Net income as per cent of net assets for the industry declined
22
from 15.6 per cent in 1950 to a low of 5.9 per cent in 1957. The effect of
John W. Tippit, "Texas Polentialities in Agricultural Implement Produc-
tion. " Research Report 41, (College Station, Texas: Texas Engineering
Experiment Station, Fegruary, 1953) » P» 9.
22
Slater, p. 1252.
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reduced profits became apparent in the 1960's when White Motor Company acquired
three firms: Oliver Farm Equipment Corporation, Minneapolis-Moline Inc. and
Cockshutt Farm Equipment of Canada Limited.
Over a period of time, the net profit of the industry was not shared
equally by all companies. The three largest firms had the highest net profits.
These profits did not mean that these firms were the most efficient. Two of
these firms were the oldest long-line firms in the industry and have established
consumer preference for their products over the years. Conant infers that the
whole market structure of the industry might be the cause of the superority
23
of the largest firms. Their distribution system affords them their competi-
tive advantage. Some new arrangement of the market structure that is more
effective may prove benefical for potential new firms and could possibly lower
the cost of farm equipment.
Although treated so far in this report as a buyer, the farm equipment
dealer is an essential part of the distribution system. Two studies conducted
during the late 1950' s pointed out some of the barriers potential new dealers
have to surmount. Important barriers are minimum capital, volume or sales,
location of business, and obtaining a franchise. Fliginger estimated that the
2k
break-even point in 1955 was a gross sales of approximately $175,000. Corty
and Morrison's analysis noted that in the areas encompassing dealers having
25
high gross income, the number of farms per dealer averaged from 232 to 382.
Capital requirements to start in business depended on the size and type
of market. Needed capital varied from $25,000 to $100,000 or more, exclusive
23Conant Ph.D. Dissertation, p. 5»
2k
Fliginger, p. 11
25
Corty and Morrison, p. 9
•H6
of land and building. Companies discouraged applicants when severe under-
26
capitalization is evident.
Prospective dealers inquiring about a franchise are considered only on
the fact that they are qualified in all respects to purchase, sell, service
and finance the company's products on a continuing basis. The potential new
dealer must sign a Dealer's Sales Agreement with the full-line company he is
to do business with. The full-line manufacturers are continually searching
out young potential dealers to develop their dealer organization. Thus, the
prospective dealer who is qualified would have little trouble acquiring a
1
franchise
.
The location of the firm is important. It must be near the normal
trade center of sufficient size to draw a number of farmers to the dealer.
Also, the new dealer must be familiar with the area. A man qualified to be a
dealer in South Dakota would have a hard go in Louisiana.
26
Ibid., 25.
V. CURRENT MARKET PERIOD
Seller Concentration
The take-over by White Motor Company of three full-line producers of
farm machinery resulted in the industry becoming more concentrated. In I960
and 1961, White Motor Company got control of Oliver Farm Equipment Company,
Minneapolis-Moline Incorporated and Cochshutt Farm Equipment of Canada Limited.
White Motor operated these firms as separate entities. Within the United
States, Oliver and Minneapolis-Moline each maintained their seperate marketing
system of branch houses, brand names, and dealers. In production, however, a
plant will often manufacture the same machine for both brand names, only dif-
ference being the color of paint applied.
Annual farm equipment sales volume of the seven companies is not published
and intra-industry knowledge of member firm's sales is limited. In discussions
with representatives from two of the full-line firms, they stated that they had
only rough estimates of their rival firm's sales. The information that these
representatives had was obtained mostly from annula reports to stockholders
and they did not consider their figure correct. Forbes published rough esti-
mates of the sales volume of the respective companies, but stressed that these
figures were very rough estimates (Table 8),
The large increase in sales between the 1959 and 1961 average and the
1965 figures illustrates the rise in farm equipment sales. How this increased
dollar volume has been distributed among all companies has not been determined.
The data of Forbes shows the firms primarily manufacturing farm equipment as
having grown the most.
"Deere and .Co." Forbes (June 15, 1966), p. 36.
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED FARM EQUIPMENT FOR SEVEN
FULL-LINE MANUFACTURERS OF FARM EQUIPMENT*
Company
Farm Equipment **
1959-61 Ave. Millions 1965 Annual Millions
Per Cent
Increase
Primarily Farm
Equipment
Case, J. I.
Deere & Co..
***Massey-Fergus on
Diversified
Allis-Chalmers
Ford Motor
Intn'l Harvester
White Motor
$125
457
395
140
380
601
$235
830
710
215
525
862
210
88$
82
80
54
38
44
SOURCE: "Deere and Co." FORBES June, 15, 1966, p. 36.
* The farm equipment sales figures are" very rough. Some companies,
such as Ford Motor, does not break out farm machinery sales at all,
other companies mix in industrial and other equipment. Thus, FORBES
figures show International Harvester slightly ahead of Deere in farm
equipment sales but Deere claims that it is ahead when industrial
sales are excluded.
**Extimated; excludes industrial equipment and diesel engines except
for International Harvester and Ford.
***Massey-Fergerson sales are in Canadian dollars.
Bureau of the Census data in Table 6, indicated an increase in the number
of small establishments. The largest increase, 30»0 per cent, came in establish-
ments, with an employment of between fifty and ninety-nine. Additional information
on these small firms is not available. The growth patterns, entry and exit
rates, competitive nature and products produced are needed to analyze the con-
centration among them and the full-line firms.
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Buyer Concentration
Dealers are decreasing in number as shown in Table 7. This is further sub-
stantiated by a study of dealerships numbers in Kansas. For Kansas, a complete
list of the farm equipment dealers is given in the Trade Directory of the Western
Retail Implements and Hardware Association for 1956 and 1963. The first
directory published in 1956 listed 1076 and in 1963 the number had dropped to
738. These totals include both the farm implement dealers and combination
dealers, those having franchised dealerships in farm equipment and in addition
handle a general line of hardware or farm supplies.
The distribution across the state of this declining dealer population
is fairly even with the South Central region and the northern row of counties
showing a slightly greater loss than the other regions. Sedgwick county with
eighteen had the most dealers of any county. Wichita is located in that
county, a fact which would support Fliginger's finding in South Dakota that in
the more heavily populated areas the size and trade area of dealers tend to be
3
smaller.
Not only are there fewer dealerships, but also fewer towns per county
have dealerships. Out of 104 counties in Kansas, only 4 showed an increase in
towns with dealers while 49 decreased. This decline was relatively even
across the state with the Central Region showing a slightly greater decline.
Also, the number of dealerships per town decreased with an average number of
dealerships per town in 1956 of 3.1 and in 1963 of 2.6.
western Retail Implement and Hardware Association, Western's Trade
Directory 1956 and 1963 . (Kansas City, Missouri, 1956, 1963).
3
^Fliginger, p. 8.
L
Western Retail Implement and Hardware Association.
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The industry in recent years has recognized the need for information on
its dealer organization. As a result, the National Farm and Power Equipment
Dealers Association organized a dealer population study and the Farm Equipment
Institute agreed to pool figures on their sales to dealers. None of this data
could be obtained for this report, but in the near future researchers will be
able to obtain access to this information.
The size distribution of dealers in Kansas is not available, however,
Corty and Morrison's study in Louisiana for I960 does include an array of
volume of business for dealers. The category with the most firms was those
firms with a dollar volume of between $100,000 to $199,999 which accounted for
32.1 per cent of all firms. The volume of business ranged from $8,000 to
slightly more than $1 million, with an average of $286,000 per firm (Table 9).
TABLE 9
VOLUME OF BUSINESS, LOUISIANA
RETAIL FARM EQUIPMENT FIRMS, I960
DOLLAR VOLUME NUMBER PER CENT
OF BUSINESS OF FIRMS OF FIRMS
up to 4-9,000 7 5
50,000 to 99,000 23 17
100,000 to 199,999 41 32
200,000 to 299,999 24 18
300,000 to 399,999 13 9
400,000 to 499,999 11 8
500,000 to 899,999 14- 10
over 900,000 2 1
Total 135 100
SOURCE: Floyd L. Corty and Richard G. Morrison "The Retail Farm Equip-
ment Business in Louisiana, 1l Bulletin No. 558 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana:
Louisiana State University Agricultural Experiment Station, October, 1962), p.13.
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As the ultimate purchaser of farm equipment, the fanner bargans with the
dealer on price and service. With the number of farms decreasing and the size
of firms increasing, the competitive relationship between the dealer and the
farmer became keen. The farmer's ability to bargin was illustrated in Fliginger's
report when dealers expressed their feelings that the farmer put dealer against
dealer.
Also, the ratio of farms per dealer has declined. In 1958, there were
6 7
19,008 dealers and 4,233,000' farms, for a farms per dealer ratio of 222.7.
8 9
In 1963, the dealers numbered 16,362 and farms numbered 3»374,000 , for a
ratio of 200.1. As the number of farms per dealer decline, each farmer becomes
more important to the dealer. Consider also, 10.3 per cent of the farmers
accounted for 51.9 per cent of the i960 agricultural sales. These 10.3 per
cent or 333,000 farms spread equally among the 16,322 dealers in 1963 leaves
only approximately 20 large farms per dealer. The fewer farms per dealer in-
dicates that farmers have gained in barganing power with the dealer.
-'Fliginger, p. 20.
6,8See Table 7.
7 9
* U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service FIS-203
"Farm Income Situation" (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,
July 1966), p. 41.
Luther G. Tweeten, "The Income Structure of Farms by Economic Class,"
Journal of Farm Economies 47 (May, 1965) p. 208.
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Barriers to Entry
Short-line manufacturers continued to crop up during the I960 as shown by
the 1963 Census of Manufacturers . The number of companies producing farm equip-
ment jumped from 1,389 in 1958 to 1,481 in 1963 as illustrated in Table 6. This
amounted to a new change of 92 companies for an average of 18.4 new companies
per year. During this period the full-line companies dropped from nine to
seven thus the increase in companies was entirely short-line manufacturers. As-
suming these firms operated under some localized competitive nature, one can
only suggest that some inefficiency of organization may exist. If this is so,
future emperical investigation would be warranted.
The entry of new dealers is controlled by manufacturers. The relation-
ship between the dealer and manufacturer is a formal contractual arrangement
termed the Dealer's Sales Agreement or a Company Dealer Contract. The current
practice of major companies has been to franchise dealers who do not sell an-
other major brand of equipment. For example, Deere and Company will not grant
a franchise to a dealer who also sells J. I. Case. Also, the manufacturers
recognize that sales volume of a dealer must be large enough to support a strong
dealer; therefore, the franchises are granted sparingly. There was not a set
pattern for laying out trade areas, but the fact remains that there is some
understanding and recognition of sales territories among dealers.
The number of dealers was controlled primarily by the full-line firms.
Also, each of the full-line companies operated a few company retail stores
which competed with independent dealers. The manufacturers had control
over the location of new firms, but little control over the established firms.
Corty and Morrison, p. 25.
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However, if the manufacturer thinks a certain trade area has a potential market
for a dealer, they often cannot find a suitable dealer to serve the area.
Thus, the relationships between the dealer and manufacturer was on an indivi-
dual basis with the manufacturer dominating because he controls the dealer's
supply of new machines and repair parts. The dealer takes the price quoted
by the manufacturer and the credit terms offered or the dealer's contract is
cancelled by the manufacturer.
VI. PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Manufacturers, dealers, and farmers constitute the main elements of the
farm equipment industry. Having so far discussed the trend of changes in the
past, this report will now project these trends and infer how these changes
will affect the manufacturers, dealers and farmers.
Reviewing the trends of changes in the market structure of the industry,
four patterns have been established. These are that full-line companies as a
group continually increased their dominance in market shares, that the short-
line manufacturers have increased in number, that dealers have decreased in
number, but increased in size, and that the number of ultimate buyers, farmers,
has decreased rapidly.
Projecting these four trends, the future state of the industry becomes
apparent. First, the full-line manufacturers will decrease in number, resulting
in still higher concentration. Second, merchandising techniques ofthese firms
will be altered, affecting the dealer organization. Third, the dealer can look
forward to doing business with fewer farmers, but better customers. Fourth,
dealers will increase their volume of business and trade area. Fifth, the
farmer will require more service and make each purchase on a more business-like
approach.
The number of full-line manufacturers has in the past stabilized or de-
clined in periods of poor farm incomes. Farm incomes in recent years have risen,
but not in a boom fashion. Thus, the profitability of farm equipment firms over
the next five years will not be high. With profits low, a reasonable projection
would be that one or more of the present seven full-line manufacturers will dis-
continue operation. The nature of this discontinuance may be by merger, con-
solidation or suspension of farm equipment operations.
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Also important will be the future developments with the short-line manu-
facturers. These typically family firms will continue to be important, but they
will be more centralized. Many of these will become dependent on wholesale
distributors and may find it profitable to form an association with the whole-
saler. Thus, the wholesaler will become more important in the distribution
system.
As farm operations become larger and the knowledge of machinery requirement
more perfected, manufacturers will adapt some of the technical merchandising
techniques used in industrial goods markets. There are some who propose that
the manufacturers establish company stores to sell all the machines and leave
the dealership organization to provide the service. Another possibility is
dealership chain operations where one dealer maintains two or more retail out-
lets under one contract.
Partly related to the more technical form of merchandizing is the inter-
relationship between the dealer and the farmer. The number of farms per dealer
will decline as was experienced in the early 1960's. The farmer will be a
better customer because he will buy larger, more complex, and more expensive
machines. To adopt these customers, the dealer must become a better businessman,
doing a large volume over a wider area giving still more service.
The last trend,, that of fewer farmers requiring more service and becoming
more formal in their business dealings, is evident from census data. The number
of farms declined by 859,000 between 1958 and 1963 and 10..3 per cent of these
farms accounted for 51.9 P©r cent of the agricultural sales. As farms get
larger and use more complex machines, the farmer will require more service.
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The purpose of this report is to present the results of a study of the
market structure changes that have occurred in the farm machinery industry
since its founding. Attention is also focused on the relationship of that
industry to the farming' sector of agriculture. The objectives of the study
were (l) to identify the changes that had occurred in the characteristics of
market structure as they are related to the farm equipment manufacturers and
dealerships and (2) to show possible implications concerning future changes
as a result of trends established by the analysis of past changes.
Market structure refers to the environmental characteristics of the market
of an industry which influences strategically the nature of competition and
prices within the market. The characteristics included in this report were
seller and buyer concentration, product differentiation and barriers to entry.
The method of analysis was to study these characteristics of market structure
in four time periods, (1) pre-1920, (2) 1920 to 1939, (3) 19^0 to 1959, and
(4) the current market period, from which patterns of changes were established.
The four following patterns were established: (1) full-line companies as
a group continually increased their dominance in market shares, (2) short-line
manufacturers have increased in number, (3) dealers have decreased in number,
but increased in size, and (4) the number of ultimate buyers, farmers, has
decreased rapidly.
Projecting these four trends,, the future state of the industry becomes
apparent. First, the full-line manufacturers will decrease in number, result-
ing in still higher concentration in the industry. Second, the merchandising
techniques of these firms will be altered and will affect the dealer organ-
ization. Third, the dealer can look forward to doing business with fewer
farmers, but better customers. Fourth, dealers will increase their volume of
business and trade area. Fifth, the farmer will require more service and make
each purchase on a more businesslike approach.
The number of full-line manufacturers has in the past stabilized or
declined in periods of low farm incomes. Farm incomes in recent years have
risen, but not in a boom fashion. Thus, the profitability of farm equipment
firms over the next five to ten years will not be high. With profits low, a
reasonable projection is that one or more of the present full-line manufac-
turers will discontinue operations. The nature of this discontinuence may be
by either merger or consolidation or be suspended farm equipment operations.
Also important will be the future development of the short-line manufac-
turers. These typically family firms will continue to be important, but they
will be more centralized. Many of these firms will become dependent on whole-
sale distributors and may find it profitable to form an association with the
wholesaler. Thus, the wholesaler will become more important in the distri-
bution system.
As farms become larger and the machinery requirements more perfected,
manufacturers will adapt some of the technical merchandising techniques used
in industrial goods markets. Some already propose that the manufacturers
establish company stores to sell all the machines and leave the dealership
organization to provide the service. Also, a possibility is a dealership
chain operation in which one dealer maintains two or more retail outlets under
one dealership contract.
Partly related to the more technical form of merchandising is the inter-
relationship between the dealer and the farmer. The number of farms per
dealer will decline as it did in the early 1960's. The farmer will be a better
customer because he will buy larger, more complex and more expensive machines.
To adapt to these customers, the dealer must become a better businessman, doing
a larger volume over a wider area and giving still more service.
That there will be fewer farmers requiring more service and becoming more
formal in their business dealings is evident from a review of census data.
Between 1958 and 1963, the number of farms decreased by 859,000; 10.3 per cent
of the farms accounted for 51.9 per cent of the agricultural sales during this
period. As farms become larger and require more complex machinery, farmers
will require more service.
